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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I . Whether an expe r t may t e s t i f y in t h e form of an 
opin ion t h a t a combination of phys ica l i n j u r i e s c r ea t ed a 
s u b s t a n t i a l r i s k of death under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(1) (c ) 
(Supp. 1986) . 
I I . Whether the evidence presen ted a t t r i a l was 
s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h the offense of second-rdegree felony c h i l d 
abuse . 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
76-5-109. Child abuse. 
(1) As used in t h i s s e c t i o n : 
(a) "Child" means a humah being 
who i s 17 y e a r s of age or l e s s ; 
(b) "Physical i n ju ry" means impairment 
of the phys ica l cond i t ion i n c l u d i n g , but not 
l i m i t e d t o , any contus ion of t he sk in , l a c e r a t i o n , 
f a i l u r e t o t h r i v e , m a l n u t r i t i o n , burn, f r a c t u r e of 
any bone, subdural hematoma, in ju ry t o any i n t e r n a l 
organ, any in ju ry causing b l eed ing , or any phys ica l 
cond i t i on which i m p e r i l s a c h i l d ' s h e a l t h or w e l f a r e ; 
(c) "Ser ious phys ica l i n j u r y " means any 
phys ica l in jury which c r e a t e s a permanent 
d i s f igu remen t ; p r o t r a c t e d l o s s or impairment of a 
func t ion of a body member, limb or organ, or 
s u b s t a n t i a l r i s k of dea th . 
(2) Any person who i n f l i c t s upon a c h i l d 
s e r i o u s phys ica l i n ju ry or , having the care and 
custody of such c h i l d , causes or pe rmi t s another 
t o i n f l i c t s e r i o u s phys ica l in ju ry upon a c h i l d 
i s g u i l t y of an offense as f o l l o w s : 
(a) If done i n t e n t i o n a l l y or 
knowingly, t he offense i s a fe lony of t he 
second degree ; 
(b) I f done r e c k l e s s l y , the offense 
i s a felony of the t h i r d degree ; 
(c) If done with cr iminal n e g l i g e n c e , 
the offense i s a c l a s s A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person who i n f l i c t s upon a c h i l d 
phys ica l in ju ry or , having the ca re and custody 
of such c h i l d , causes or pe rmi t s another t o 
i n f l i c t phys ica l i n ju ry upon a c h i l d i s g u i l t y 
of an offense as f o l l o w s : 
(a) If done i n t e n t i o n a l l y or 
knowingly, t he offense i s a c l a s s A misdemeanor; 
(b) If done r e c k l e s s l y , the offense 
- i i i -
is a class B misdemeanor; 
(c) If done with criminal negligence, 
the offense is a class C misdemeanor. 
(4) Criminal actions under this section may 
be prosecuted in the county or district where 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
where the existence of the offense is discovered, 
where the victim resides, or where the defendant 
resides. 
-iv-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaint i f f -Respondent , : Case No. 860250 
- v - : 
CALEEN LOWE JONES, : Pr ior i ty No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Caleen Lowe Jones, was charged with ch i ld 
abuse, a second degree fe lony, in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-109(2) (a) (Supp. 1986) . 
Defendant was convicted of ch i ld abuse, in a jury t r i a l 
held February 24 , 1986, in the Fi f th Judic ia l D i s t r i c t Court, in 
and for Iron County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Harlan 
Burns, pres iding. Defendant was sentenced by Judge Burns on 
April 10 , 1986, to a term of imprisonment not l e s s than one year 
nor more than f i f t e e n years in the Utah State Prison. 
STATE OF THE FACTS 
During the l a s t part of Apri l , 1985, defendant, Caleen 
Lowe Jones, and her natural s o n , ! s ix teen month old, Jacob Hart 
Jones, moved i n t o a house t r a i l e r located in north Cedar Valley 
(R. Vol. 4 , 56-57) . Defendant moved in to the t r a i l e r with her 
1 The t r i a l court found that defendant was the mother and lega l 
custodian of Jacob Hart Jones (R. Vol. 1 , 179, 188) . 
boyfriend, James Chad Anderson, who, as a co-defendant, pleaded 
gui l ty to child abuse, a thi rd-degree felony (R. Vol. 2 , 169-
171). After h is plea was entered, his case was severed from the 
present action (R. Vol. 2 , 173). 
On May 19, 1985, while in the care of Mr. Anderson, 
Jacob was placed in contact with the hot door of a c lothes dryer 
and as a r e su l t received second-degree burns on h is buttocks and 
l e f t leg down to his calf. The burns were in a grid-work pat tern 
(R. Vol. 1 , 97; Vol. 2 , 170). Defendant Jones did not notice the 
burns unt i l the next morning and waited un t i l early afternoon to 
take her son to the Valley View Medical Center (R. Vol. 4, 116). 
When they arr ived a t the emergency room, Doctor Michael S t u l t s 
examined the physical condition of the young chi ld and found t h a t 
in addi t ion to the large burn, the baby had many bruises of 
various ages and s i z e s . The bruises were located on both the 
soft and bony areas of his body especia l ly on the stomach, chest , 
neck, and the backs of his l egs . The doctor s ta ted tha t i t was 
"highly unusual to see t h i s many bruises on any child a t one time 
anywhere" (R. Vol. 1 , 100). 
The treatment of second-degree burns i s usually a very 
painful and traumatic experience especia l ly for a young chi ld .2 
However, Doctor S t u l t s and other hospi tal personnel observed t h a t 
Jacob "was remarkably withdrawn and qu i e t . He never cr ied . He 
only whimpered a l i t t l e b i t . " Instead of crying for h is mother 
2 The nurses normally have to s t rap young chi ldren to a papoose 
board by using velcro s t raps in order to hold the children down 
for treatment (R. Vol. 3 , 420). 
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or demonstrating any separation anxiety from her as other small 
children would, he just sat there (R. Vol. 1 , 111, Vol. 3 , 422). 
Before leaving the medical center , defendant was t o l d t o keep the 
c h i l d ' s diaper dry 6ince urine on the burn would be painful to 
her son. However, on each return v i s i t to the hospi ta l the 
nurses found Jacob's diaper saturated with urine (R. Vol. 3 , 428, 
440) . They a lso reported that when the ch i ld was treated on each 
subsequent v i s i t , he was withdrawn, detached, and did not cry as 
the painful treatment was administered (R. Vol. 3 , 428, 446) . 
Shortly after the severe burns were f i r s t treated , a 
pol ice i n v e s t i g a t i o n was s tarted . As part of that i n v e s t i g a t i o n , 
defendant agreed that she and her l i t t l e boy, would stay away 
from Mr. Anderson. However, on May 29, 1985, Kerry Hedin of 
Family Li fe Serv ices found that defendant, Jacob, and Mr. 
Anderson were once again l i v i n g together at the trai lerhouse 
contrary to their agreement (R. Vol. 3 , 464). 
On the evening of May 30, 1985 defendant and Mr. 
Anderson had an in tense , physical argument caused by h i s f e e l i n g s 
toward Jacob (R. Vol. 4 r 90 -94 ) . At 11:30 p.m., Anderson put 
Jacob to bed and 30 minutes l a t er the infant was in a s ta t e of 
cardiac arrest (R. Vol. 3 , 520) . Defendant claimed that Anderson 
put the v ict im in a cold shower attempting to revive him (R. Vol. 
3 , 398) yet when they arrived a t the medical center , Jacob was 
completely dry (R. Vol. 2 , 398) . The doctors and nurses also 
not iced puncture marks on the bottom of the c h i l d ' s f e e t (R. Vol. 
2 , 235-36, 400). Defendant denied any knowledge of the cause of 
these wounds (R. Vol. 2 , 400) . 
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The medical personnel managed to rees tab l i sh Jacob's 
heartbeat and he was transported to Primary Children's Hospital 
in Sa l t Lake City , Utah where he died (R. Vol. 2 , 403 , 406 ) . An 
autopsy was performed and the report s tated that the vict im died 
of natural causes (R. Vol. 2 , 323) . However, the medical 
personnel refuted t h i s and claimed that the infant was abused (R. 
Vol. 2 , 267, 340-41 , 351-52) . Dr. William Martin Palmer, an 
expert in the diagnosis of chi ld abuse, was of the opinion that 
Jacob was mal ic ious ly abused (R. Vol. 2 , 340-41) . Dr. Palmer 
explained: 
The kind of thing I'm talking about i s the 
kind of material that goes on in whoever i t 
i s that created the burn in t h i s boy to want 
to hurt him badly enough that they, whomever, 
held him against the object that burned him 
long enough to i n f l i c t ser ious burns, which 
are painful , which cer ta in ly should have 
resu l ted in screams and c r i e s , and so on; and 
yet e i ther he (Jacob) d idn' t because he had 
had t h i s happen to him enough so he knew what 
would happen i f he did say anything, or he 
did in fac t have something happen to him and 
i t jus t i s n ' t part of our information base. 
(R. Vol. 2 , 341) . He t e s t i f i e d that Jacob f i t wel l within the 
ba t t ered-ch i ld syndrome (R. Vol. 2 , 299, 300) . Dr. Palmer a l so 
t e s t i f i e d that i t was h i s opinion the physical i n j u r i e s Jacob 
received created a substant ia l risk of death for the infant (R. 
Vol. 2 , 361). He formulated h i s opinion based on wri t ten reports 
compiled by medical personnel who treated Jacob. He a l so viewed 
photographs of the severe burns, bru i se s , and puncture wounds 
that were found on Jacob's body (R. Vol. 2 , 317, 358) . These 
i n j u r i e s contributed to a c r i t i c a l swel l ing of the brain from 
which Jacob died (R. Vol. 2 , 310, 352, 360) . 
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On F e b r u a r y 2 7 , 1 9 8 6 , t h e j u r y found d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y 
of c h i l d a b u s e , a second d e g r e e f e l o n y (R. 57) ,3 and on A p r i l 1 0 , 
1 9 8 6 , Judge Burns s e n t e n c e d h e r t o a term of impr i sonmen t n o t 
l e s s t h a n one y e a r nor more t h a n f i f t e e n y e a r s i n t h e Utah S t a t e 
P r i s o n (R. 6 2 ) . From t h i s c o n v i c t i o n and s e n t e n c e d e f e n d a n t now 
a p p e a l s . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
An e x p e r t may t e s t i f y in t h e form of an o p i n i o n t h a t a 
c o m b i n a t i o n of " p h y s i c a l i n j u r i e s " c r e a t e d a " s u b s t a n t i a l r i s k of 
d e a t h " unde r 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 9 (1) ( c ) . 
A l s o , t h e e v i d e n c e was s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t 
d e f e n d a n t i n t e n t i o n a l l y or knowingly i n f l i c t e d or p e r m i t t e d 
a n o t h e r t o i n f l i c t s e r i o u s p h y s i c a l i n j u r y upon he r son . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE'S EXPERT WITNESS WAS PROPERLY 
ALLOWED TO RENDER HIS OPINION THAT UNDER 
ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES THE 
PHYSICAL INJURIES TO THE CHILD VICTIM 
CREATED A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OR DEATH. 
D e f e n d a n t , i n h e r b r i e f , c h a l l e n g e s t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y 
of t h e e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y of Dr. W i l l i a m M a r t i n Palmer who 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t , in h i s o p i n i o n , m u l t i p l e p h y s i c a l i n j u r i e s 
c r e a t e d a s u b s t a n t i a l r i s k of d e a t h f o r t h e 1 6 - m o n t h - o l d J a c o b 
3 Utah Code Ann. S 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 9 (2) (a) (Supp. 1 9 8 6 ) . "Any p e r s o n who 
i n f l i c t s upon a c h i l d s e r i o u s p h y s i c a l i n j u r y o r , h a v i n g t h e c a r e 
and c u s t o d y of such c h i l d , c a u s e s or p e r m i t s a n o t h e r t o i n f l i c t 
s e r i o u s p h y s i c a l i n j u r y upon a c h i l d i s g u i l t y of an o f f e n s e a s 
f o l l o w s : 
(a) I f done i n t e n t i o n a l l y or knowing ly , t h e o f f e n s e i s a 
f e l o n y of t h e second d e g r e e ; " 
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Hart Jones . 4 However, the central issue of t h i s appeal i s 
whether Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-109(1)(c) (Supp. 1986)5 allows 
physical in ju r i e s to be taken in the aggregate to cons t i tu t e a 
•ser ious physical in ju ry . " If i t does, then Dr. Pa lmer s 
testimony was c lea r ly proper. I t was on t h i s narrow issue and a 
claim of surpr i se that defendant objected to Dr. Palmer's 
testimony a t t r i a l . She did not challenge the doc to r ' s 
qua l i f i c a t i ons to render the opinion given. (R. Vol. 2 , 284, 
309, 330, 359). 
Defendant claims there can be no construct ion of the 
s ta tu tory def in i t ion of "serious physical injury" tha t would 
allow a combining of a s e r i e s of individual "physical i n ju r i e s " 
in order to create a "substant ia l r isk of death" (Appellant 's 
Brief a t 8 ) . However, the wording of 76-5-109 suggests t ha t such 
construct ion was intended by the Legis la tu re . 
4
 Utah Rule of Evidence 702 c l ea r ly s t a t e s : 
If s c i e n t i f i c , t echnica l , or other special ized 
knowledge wi l l a s s i s t the t r i e r of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in i s sue , a witness qual i f ied as an expert by 
knowledge, s k i l l , experience, t r a in ing , or 
education, may t e s t i f y there to in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise. 
Dr. William Martin Palmer was accepted as an expert by the 
t r i a l court and was allowed to a s s i s t the jury by giving them h i s 
expert opinion which was based on h is knowledge, experience, 
t r a in ing , and education in the area of chi ld abuse. (R. Vol. 2, 
2 8 4 ) . 
5 76-5-109. Child Abuse. 
(1) As used in t h i s sec t ion : 
(c) "Serious physical injury" means any 
physical injury which crea tes a permanent disfigurement; 
protracted loss or impairment of a function of a body member, 
limb or organ, or subs tan t ia l r isk of death. 
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According t o 76-5-109(1)(c): 
"Serious physical injury" means any physical 
injury which creates a permanent disfigurement; 
protracted loss or impairment of a function of 
a body member, limb or organ, or substant ia l 
r isk or death. 
(emphasis added). "Physical injury" i s defined in subsection 
(1) (b) a s : 
[I Impairment of the physical conditi on including, 
but not l imited t o , any contusion of the skin, 
l ace ra t ion , f a i lu re to th r ive , malnutr i t ion, 
burn, f racture of any bone, subdural hematoma, 
injury to any in terna l organ, any injury 
causing bleeding, or any physical condition 
which imperils a c h i l d ' s health or welfare. 
(emphasis added). Thus, a "physical injury" i s the "impairment 
of the physical condition" which may include "any physical 
condition which imperils a c h i l d ' s health or welfare ." ^Serious 
physical injury" encompasses these same fac tors but add i t iona l ly 
requires a "permanent disfigurement; protracted loss or 
impairment of a function of a body member, limb or organ, or 
subs tant ia l r isk of death." 
Clearly, a series or combination of injuries can create 
an "impairment of physical condition" which "imperils a c h i l d ' s 
health or welfare ." The s t a t u t e , by i t s own terms, i s not as 
l imi t ing as defendant suggests . There i s no int imation in the 
above language tha t the l e g i s l a t u r e intended "physical i n ju r i e s " 
to be l imited to s ingle ac t s rather than se r i e s of a c t s . The 
•Court's primary respons ib i l i ty in construing l e g i s l a t i o n i s to 
give effect to the in ten t of the l e g i s l a t u r e . " Christensen v. 
Indus t r i a l Commission, 642 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1983). 
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Prior to 1981, Utah did not have a child abuse statute. 
The State relied primarily upon the aggravated assault statute, 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-103 (1953), as amended, when prosecuting 
child abusers. This section reads as follows: 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault 
if he commits assault as defined in section 
76-5-102 and: 
(a) He intentionally causes serious 
bodily injury to another; or 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such 
means or force likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a felony of the 
third degree. 
In State v. King, 604 P.2d 923, 926 (Utah 1979), this Court cited 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-609(9) (1953), as amended, which "defines 
•serious bodily injury1 as 'bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of 
the function of any bodily member or organ or creates a 
substantial risk of death.'"6 Mr. King strangled, stabbed, and 
attempted to rape the victim. This Court found that it was 
proper for an expert witness to consider all of these factors in 
determining whether the victim "sustained such bodily injury as 
would create a substantial risk of death." King, 604 P.2d at 
926. 
When the Utah l e g i s l a t u r e discussed the proposed c h i l d 
abuse s t a t u t e in January of 1981 neither the House of 
Representat ives nor the Senate addressed the i s sue of simple v s . 
mult ip le physical i n j u r i e s . Therefore, t h i s Court must look 
6 This d e f i n i t i o n i s almost ident i ca l with the d e f i n i t i o n of 
"serious physical injury" under 76-5-109. 
- 8 -
within the meaning and in tent of the child abusfe s t a t u t e . In an 
instance when s ta tu tory in t e rp re t a t ion i s required: 
Allowances should be made for the fact 
that s t a t u t e s are necessar i ly s ta ted in 
general terms, and tha t often there i s nei ther 
the presence to foresee, nor suf f ic ien t 
f l e x i b i l i t y of language to cover with 
exact i tude , a l l of the exigencies of l i f e 
which may a r i s e . For t h i s reason one of 
the fundamental ru les of s ta tu tory construction 
i s tha t s t a t u t e s should be looked a t as a whole 
and in the l i gh t of the general purpose i t 
was intended to serve; and should be so 
in te rpre ted and applied as to accomplish that 
object ive. In order to give the s t a t u t e the 
implementation which will f u l f i l l i t s purpose, 
reason and in tent ion sometimes prevail over 
technical ly applied l i t e r a l n e s s . 
Andrus v. Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 404 P. 2d 972, 974 (1965); see 
also Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915. 916 (1964). 
The sponsor of 76-5-109, Representative Harrison, said 
tha t the child abuse b i l l was intended to f a c i l i t a t e the 
prosecution of chi ld abuse cases since they were d i f f i c u l t to 
prosecute under the aggravated assaul t s t a t u t e . He also sa id : 
This b i l l rea l ly goes to solve a problem of 
defining a s t a tu te expressly for child abuse. 
I t does increase the pena l t i es over the 
ex is t ing aggravated assaul t pena l t i e s . I t 
defines the crime of child abuse more 
spec i f i ca l ly to cover the types of i n ju r i e s 
children sustain . . . . From the information 
that I ' ve received, i t appears tha t ttyis 
( s ta tu te ) i s needed because of the increases 
in child abuse. 
HB 87, 44th Legis. , 8th Sess. (January 19, 1981). To l imi t the 
def in i t ion of "serious physical injury" to only one injury would 
destroy the major purpose of the s t a t u t e which }s t o curb the 
increase in child abuse. 
$ 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-106 (1953) , as amended, contains 
the guiding standards this Court should use in construing 76-5-
109(1) (c): 
The rule tha t a penal s t a t u t e i s t o be 
s t r i c t l y construed shal l not apply to 
t h i s code, any of i t s provis ions, or any 
offense defined by the laws of t h i s s t a t e . 
All provisions of t h i s code and offenses 
defined by the laws of t h i s s t a t e shal l 
be construed according t o the f a i r import 
of the i r terms to promote j u s t i c e and to 
effect the object of the law and general 
purposes of Section 76-1-104.7 
Jus t i ce can only be promoted in t h i s and future chi ld 
abuse cases by allowing in ju r i e s to be considered in the 
aggregate when dealing with a "serious physical injury" under 76-
5-109(1) (c ) . 
Dr. Palmer, therefore , was properly allowed to give 
opinion testimony concerning the ind ica to rs of chi ld abuse, 
including the combination of i n ju r i e s Jacob received which 
created a subs tan t ia l r i sk of death. 
7
 Section 76-1-104 reads as follows: 
The provisions of t h i s code sha l l be construed 
in accordance with these general purposes. 
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of 
offenses; 
(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental 
s t a t e which cons t i tu te each offense and 
safeguard conduct tha t i s without fau l t from 
condemnation as cr iminal ; 
(3) Prescribe pena l t i e s which are proport ionate 
to the seriousness of offenses and which permit 
recognit ion or differences in r e h a b i l i t a t i o n 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s among individual offenders. 
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POINT I I 
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED 
THAT DEFENDANT INTENTIONALLY OR 
KNOWINGLY INFLICTED OR PERMITTED 
ANOTHER TO INFLICT SERIOUS PHYSICAL 
INJURY UPON THE CHILD VICTIM. 
As t h e above s t a n d a r d i s a p p l i e d t o t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , 
t h e r e i s ample e v i d e n c e t o a f f i r m t h e d e f e n d a n t s c o n v i c t i o n of 
c h i l d a b u s e , a s e c o n d - d e g r e e f e l o n y , in t h e lower c o u r t . 8 J a c o b 
r e c e i v e d numerous b r u i s e s or c o n t u s i o n s over most of h i s body. 
Hal f of h i s body was b a d l y b u r n e d . Both of h i s f e e t were 
r e p e a t e d l y p u n c t u r e d w i t h a s h a r p i n s t r u m e n t and he u l t i m a t e l y 
d i e d of a s e v e r e s w e l l i n g of t h e b r a i n . These i n j u r i e s n o t o n l y 
i m p e r i l e d t h e c h i l d ' s w e l l - b e i n g , bu t were a l s p l i f e - t h r e a t e n i n g . 
(R. Vol . 2 , 3 6 1 ) . 
Defendan t a s s e r t s t h a t s h e s h o u l d o n l y have been 
c o n v i c t e d of a c l a s s A misdemeanor . In making t h i s c l a i m , 
d e f e n d a n t a g a i n r e l i e s on t h e e r r o n e o u s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t a 
c o m b i n a t i o n or s e r i e s of i n j u r i e s canno t be used t o c o n s t i t u t e a 
" s e r i o u s p h y s i c a l i n j u r y " unde r 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 9 ( 1 ) ( c ) . See A p p e l l a n t ' s 
B r i e f a t 9 . The c l e a r i n t e n t and p u r p o s e of t h e c h i l d a b u s e 
s t a t u t e would be d e s t r o y e d i f t h i s a s s u m p t i o n w e r e t r u e . 
S i n c e t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of " s e r i o u s p h y s i c a l 
i n j u r y " can be r e a s o n a b l y c o n s t r u e d a s meaning any p h y s i c a l 
i n j u r y or. c o m b i n a t i o n of i n j u r i e s , t h e c o n v i c t i o n and s e n t e n c e 
8 At t r i a l , Judge Burns s a i d : " t T l a k e n i n t h e a g g r e t a t e , t h e 
i n j u r i e s may be s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r t h e f i n d i n g beyond a 
r e a s o n a b l e doubt by t h e j u r y t h a t t h e i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d o v e r t h e 
t ime m a t e r i a l t o t h e c h a r g e i n t h i s c a s e c o n s t i t u t e d a 
s u b s t a n t i a l r i s k of d e a t h " (R. Vol . 3 , 4 7 2 ) . 
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were proper and should stand. The defendant knowingly or 
intentionally9 inflicted or permitted another to inflict serious 
physical injury upon her son, thus creating a substantial risk of 
death. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons presented above, the s t a t e r e s p e c t f u l l y 
requests that defendant's convict ion and sentence be affirmed. 
DATED t h i s 2 o day of January, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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9 Defendant apparently admits that the i n j u r i e s were i n f l i c t e d 
knowingly or i n t e n t i o n a l l y by claiming that the crime should have 
been a c l a s s A misdemeanor under 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 9 ( 3 ) ( a ) . See Appel lant ' s 
Brief at 10. 
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